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STAn:t1ENT OF NATURE CF THE C/>.SE

This is an appeal frCJITl an Order denying Defendant's Potion to Set
P.side and/or fudify a portion of the Decree of Divorce dealing with
monthly payments of $176.50 made by Defendant to Plaintiff, to be applied
to rrortgage payments on the hOFe.
DISPCSITICl1 IN lCWER CaJRT

Judge Maurice Harding, of the Third District Cot.irt of Salt lake
County, State of Utah, refused to rrodify or set aside a provision of
the Divorce Decree, finding that the monthly payrrents of $176.50 paid
to Plaintiff by the Defendant were part of a property settlerrent (Tr 147)
and the parties were bound by the decree.

However, the C'.ourt lowered

the arrount to $122. 06 per mmth due to the fact the previous arrount
included taxes and fire insurance which it held the Defendant was not
obligated to pay, and ordered Defendant to continue to niake said payrrents
to the Plaintiff lllltil such time as the total nortgage indebtedness of
approx:i.Irately $13,000 (Thirteen Thousand Dollars) was fully paid (Tr ll5-ll6).
RElIEF SaJGlIT CN .APPE.Al.

1.

That this Court find the m:mthly payrrents, to be applied towards

the rrortgage payment, were in the nature of support and terminated
upon Plaintiff's rem:rrriage and sale of the property.
2.

Should this Court find said payrrents were part of a property

settlenl:nt, that it exercise its equitable jurisdiction pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated §30-3-5, and find such a rraterial change of circumstances
exists that Defendant should not be required to continue said m:mthly
pavrients.Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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3.

In the alternative, that the Court find the provisions of

the Decree dealing with said m:mthly payments fails because it is fotmded
upon a stipulation containing a material mistake and remand the case
so that the issue of who should be held responsible for the unpaid
installments of the rrnrtgage payments may be litigated.
STATEMEtil' CF FACTS

Plaintiff filed a Corrplaint for Divorce on March 26, 1976 (Tr 2-4).
Defendant answered on April 9, 1976, and asked that the Q:q:>laint be
dismissed (Tr
Ch

).

January 5, 1977, the parties entered into an agreement entitled

STIPlITATION, WAIVER MID PROPER'IY SEITLEl1ENI' FOR DIVORCE (Tr

).

Defendant withdrew his Pnswer and consented to entry of his default
consistent with the tenns and ccnditions set forth in the Stipulation.

The Stipulation provided that, inter alia, Defendant should be awarded
certain real property in Florida and Plaintiff should be awarded
the

ha;ie

and real property in Utah.

The Florida property was purchased

for $3,500.00 and Defendant estimated it was
at the ti.rre of the divorce (Tr

~th

less than that

), whereas, Plaintiff estimated its

value had increased to $7 , 500. 00 (Tr

).

Plaintiff estimated that the

bane and real property which she was to receive to be w:>rth $46, 000. 00

with a rrnrtgage indebedness of $13, 653. 46.
The Stipulation further provided that Defendant

~d

pay $300.00

per rronth as alim:my; that Defendant would pay to Plaintiff $176.50
each roonth, to be applied to the rrnrtgage payrrents on the bane; that
Plaintiff

~ld

receive the bulk of the furniture (Tr 137) ; that

the Defendant should asSt.Jr.)2 and pay any debts incurred during the
marriage, which arrounted to approximately $4,000.00 (Tr 138);
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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that Plaintiff vJOuld receive the Mlstang car and I:efendant YX>Uld make
the car payrtents 1.filtil the car was fully paid for; and the Defendant "WOUld
receive the VoU·.swagon Van.

Concerning the rronthly payrrents of $176.50,

both the Stipulation and the Divorce I:ecree were silent as to the exact
nature of such payments ; whether they were rrodifiable by either party;
what effect Plaintiff's death or remarriage or Defendant's death, or
sale of the hane YX>Uld have on them; and whether such payments were to be
given in return for Plaintiff's relinquishmznt of any property rigPts.
Ch January 25, 1977, the matter cane before the court, Plaintiff
appearing in person and with counsel and I:efendant not appearing.

A

I:ecree of Divorce was signed on February 9, 1977, and incorporated the
ternis of the Stipulation, Waiver and Property SettleIY1ent (Tr 74-77).
In July, 1977, Plaintiff sold the hane for $60.000.00 (Tr 136),

and the rrortgage indebtedness was approximately $13, 000. 00 (Tr 137).
Plaintiff married Dr. Swithin Qiandler sometirre prior to August 1, 1977,
(Tr 107).

Begirming in August, 1977, I:efendant stopped paying the

$176.50 to Plaintiff each rronth, and Plaintiff filed an Order To Show Cause
on 1:-bvernber 14, 1977, asking that I:efendant be directed to pay the
1.mpaid rrortgage payments and to pay all future rort:gage payments as they
accrued (Tr 104).

In response, I:efendant filed a Motion to Set Aside

and/or t-bdify Decree and Affidavit in support thereof, alleging that I:efendant
1.ilderstood and intended the roonthly payrnents of $176.50 to be in the
nature of support and that said obligation tenninated on Plaintiff's
remarriage and sale of the home (Tr

).

A hearing was held on these matters on January 26, 1978.

Although

District Court Judge Maurice Harding ruled the rront:hly payments to be
applied to the rrortgage payments were not rrodifiable because they were
part

of a property settlement, he reduced the am:runt to $122.06 to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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reflect taxes and fire insurance which had been included in the $176.50
and which he held Defendant was not required to pay.

An Order was

signed by the Judge on September 28, 1978 (Tr 115-116).
Defendant filed his l'Jotice of Appeal from that Order on October
25, 1978 (Tr 117).
POINT I

THE IDNTHLY PAYMENIS MADE BY DEFENDANT TO PlAINITFF, TO BE APPLIED
TO THE lDP.TGAGE PAYMENTS, WERE Ill TI-IE NATI.,'RE OF SUPPORT AND SHOUID HAVE
TERMINATED UPON PI.AilTI'IFF' S REMARRIAGE AND SALE OF THE PROPERTY.

Defendant's fution to Set Aside and/or fudify Decree dealt with
the following portion of the Decree ·which was based upon a Stipulation the
parties had entered into:
2. That the Plaintiff be and she hereby is awarded
the parties ' hane located at 2646 fulphin Way, Salt Lake
City, Utah, as her sole and separate property, free and clear
of any claim or interest of the Defendant. Defendant be
and he hereby is ordered to make all rrortgage payrrents
on said property and to pay off and satisfy any and all liens
on the property, if any exist. The defendant be
and he he!l'."eby is additionally ordered to pay the
Plaintiff the sum of Che Hundred Seventy-six fullars and
Fifty Cents ($176.50) each m:mth, conmencing :il!mediately,
to be applied to the rrortgage payrrents on said hare.
A close look at the language of the disputed provision of the Decree
discloses significant emissions, the IIDst inportant one being that
there is no order to the effect that Defendant was to "assuma and pay the
entire rortgage indebtedness and hold the Plaintiff hannless therefrom";
or that he was to make the m:mthly rrortgage payrrents '\mtil such time as
the IIDrtgage indebtedness is fully paid." In paragraph 4 of the Decree
it is clearly stated Defendant was to make the remaining payments of
Plaintiff's vehicle by paying to her $103.05 each m:mth, '\mtil such
time as the vehicle is fully pt.rrchased and paid for." And in paragraph
ll of the Decree, Defendant was ordered to dssume and pay and hold the
11

Plaintiff hannless fran the payrrent of a..1y debts" incurred by the parties
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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during their rrarr:-i_a8e.

These specific statements in other paragraphs

that Defendant was ordered to "assume and pay" the debts and pay until
the car is "fully purchased and paid for" make such omissions in
paragraph 2 dealing with the rrortgage payments all the rrore significant.
There are other :inportant omissions in paragraph 2 such as:

what effect

Plaintiff's remarriage, death, sale of the property or Defendant's
death "WOUld have on the m:mthly payments; whether they were m:xlifiable
by either party upon a showing of changed circumstances; and whether
they were given in consideration for Plaintiff's relinquishment of
canparable property rights.
Furthenrore, the paragraph is a!!lbiguous. It states:
Defendant be and is hereby ordered to make all
rrortgage payments on said property, and to pay off
and satisfy any and all liens on the property, if any exist.
(Errphasis added)
Since the parties and the Court were aware of the existing nvrtgage
indebtedness, a reasonable interpretation of the above sentence
is that Defendant was required to pay any tax liens, rrechanics liens, or
other such liens of a similar nature, if in fact any existed.

It

~d

not make sense to read it as requiring Defendant to pay off the entire
mortgage encur.brance since it is obvious from the same paragraph that it
clearly existed.

Defendant does not dispute that he was ordered to pay

$176.50 each m:mth to Plaintiff to be applied to the TIYJrtgage payments.
What is disputed is W'l1o is responsible for the outstanding rrortgage
indebtedness now that the property has been sold and Plaintiff has
rerm.rried.

The language of the Stipulation and Decree does not

specifically answer this question but is ambiguous.
vJhere an ambiguity exists in a property settlement agreement approved
by the court, the agreement must be considered in light of all the circumstances
surrounding its execution.

Vlhere one construction

~d

make the contract

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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mreasonable and irrational, and another equally consistent with its
language would make it reasonable, the court should interpret it so
as to lead to a rational result.

Smith v. Smith, 351 P. 2d 142 (Wash 1960)

It VJOUld be an irrational result for the court to interpret the provision
as an agreenent that Defendant WJuld assurre responsibility for the entire
rrortgage indebtedness of approximately $13,000.00 even if Plaintiff
sold the property and remarried.

He had already agreed Plaintiff should

have property estimated at $46,000.00 at the ti.Ire, and in return he
received property worth either $3,500.00 or $7,500.00.
indebtedness alone is

tWJ

The rrortgage

or three ti.Ires rrore than the entire property

received by Lefendant. Since the parties' equity in the hane at the
ti.Ire of the divorce was rrnre than sufficient to pay off the rrortgage,
a nnre reasonable interpretation is that Defendant agreed to pay the
m:nthly payments as support so that Plaintiff could remain living in
the hane so long as she desired to live there, and that upon sale of

the hane, Plaintiff VJOUld pay off the rrortgage indebtedness frcxn the
sales price.
It is Defendant's position that the executory payments of $176.50
each m::nth were in the nature of support and should have terminated upon
Plaintiff's remarriage and sale of the property.

The court retains

equitable jurisdiction to mxlify a diwrce decree for alinony upon a
showing of changed circumstances, regardless of whether the decree was
based upon an agreerrent of the parties.

Callister v. Callister, 261

P. 2d 944 (Utah 1953).
The agreement entered into by the parties entitled"Stipulation,
Waiver and Property Settlerent for Diwrce"settled claims for alinony
and support and also settled the parties' property rights by giving
Plaintiff the home and real property in Utah and giving Defendant ::he
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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land in Florida.

The general rule in the majority of jurisdictions in

such a case is that if the provisons for support are an integral
and inseparable part of the property settlement, as where the support
payments are in consideration for a transfer of property, the decree
based on the agreerient carmot be rodified with respect to the support
payments.

However, where the support provisions are separable fran

the property provisons, the court can alter the support provisons but
cannot alter the property provisions 61 ALR 3d §19 (a) p. 590.

Defendant

contends that by statute, Utah Courts are given broader power th.:m other
jurisdictions and can rrodify even property settlements (Point II).
However, the trial court held the m:m.thly payments were part of a
property settlement and non-modifiable.

A discussion of cases which have

dealt with the issue of whether a divorce agreernent was an integrated
property settlement or whether the support provisons were severable and
therefore modifiable, is useful in the instant case in interpreting the

meanine of Plaintiff's and Defendant's agreement.
This Court is not bound by the trial court's interpretation of
the agreernent, but rrust make an independent detennination.

Egan v. Egan,

59 Cal. Pptr. 705 (Cal. App. 1967).
The de:;ignation by the parties of the payments as "alirrony" or as
constituting a "property settl.rrent" is not controlling.
''. . . no rmgic exists in the rere mention of the

~rds

Egan,

~·

al:im:my, property

settlement, or child support. '' Dreyer v. Dreyer, 519 P. 2d 12, 13 (Wash. App.
1974).

Rather, the courts look at all of the provisions of the agreement

to detennine if the payments have the indica of support payments or
whether the payments were given in consideration for a relinquishment
of the other party's property rif,hts. Prime v. Prime, 139 P.2d 550 (Ore. 1943).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In Becket v. Becket, 77 C.al Rptr. 134 (Cal. App. 1969) the parties

agreed and the court ordered that the defendant

~d

receive rrore than

half of the carm.mity property, alrrost half of the joint tenancy property,
some real estate fran Plaintiff's separate property and rnonthly pa)'llE'lts
of $1,200.00 for 10 years.

The c.ourt found the rronthly pa)'llE'lts were

not reciprocal provisions for the property settlement and therefore
tenninated upon Defendant's remarriage.

The court state:l the general

rule that:
The receipt of a disproportionate arrOLmt of property
and benefits by the defendant results in an :ilq:Jlication
of intent that the monthly pa)'llE'lts were not a
reciprocal cons~deration for those provisions relating
to a division of property.
77 Cal Rptr. 134,140
The court also noted significant omissions in the agreerrent and decree

which are also omitted in the present case.
in the

two

cases:

(1)

There are no provisions

dealing with the effect of remarriage; (2)

express:

stating whether the rronthly pa)'llE'ltS constitute reciprocal consideration
for the property division; or (3)

concerning m:xiification of the pa)'llE'lts.

A case similar to the present one is Barrong vs. Barrong, 549
P. 2d 530, 532 (Ore. App. 1976).

There the agree!E'lt the parties entered

into and mi.ch was made a part of <the divorce decree provided that the
wife should have the parties ' residence and:
" . . . There is presently an unpaid balance due
on the rrortgage of the dwelling . . . and the husband
agrees to make said pa)'llE'ltS. . . "
The court held that even though spousal support was not mentioned,
it could be inferred that both parties really intended the rrortgage
· pay.mants to be in the nature of support rather than a division of
property and therefore said sums were m:xiifiable.

The agreerrent was

silent as to the effect of sale of the horre, and remarriage of the wife.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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°11'.e court held that the sale of the hane did not tenninate the payments.

Relevant in its deterr:rination was the fact that the wife only received
$199.00 fr= the sale of the hane and had to comnence renting a hane
for herself and the children.

The C'.ourt also nodified the prior order

by setting a termination date for the monthly pa)'l"'eilts for the wife at
age 62 or remarriage.

In Garnett v. Garnett, 526 P. 2d 549 (Ore. 1974), the parties entered
into a settlement which was incorporated into the decree and provided
that the wife was awarded the home and the husband would pay the insurance,
taxes, all household utilities and maintain the premises in a liveable
condition so long as the wife lived in the home.

Despite a provision

in the agreenent and decree that reI'larriage of the wife "WOUld not tenninate
the husband's obligations, the court held that the executory llI)I'lthly
payrrents were in the nature of support and separable fran the property
division, noting that the division of property was substantially equal.
The court m:>dified the payments by terminating tha:i. because of the wife's
remarriage.
Even in cases where the parties have explicitly agreed the decree
was non-r.ndifiable or that remarriage would not effect the payments,
the courts have looked behind such language to detennine 1i.f the agreement
to pay rronthly payments was given as consideration for relinquishment of
property rig,hts of similar value.

If the court finds the payrrents ~e

not part of a settlerrent of property rights , it will nodify the payments
upon a showing of substantial change of circumstances, despite language
in the decree to the contrary.

Feves v. Feves, 254 P. 2d 694 (Ore. 1953);

Prime v. Prime, 139 P.2d 550 (Ore. 1943); and Wright v. Wright, 498

P.2d 80 (Kan. 1972).
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The courts do not concern themselves that rruch with the form of
the payments made by one party, whether they are made in a lump sum, or

as m:mthly payments for a definite period or indefinite period, or in
the form of m:mthly rrortgage payments.

Nor is the determinative

element the designation made by the parties as "alirrvny" or "property
settlement".

The critical element in determining whether such payments

were part of an integrated property settlement, and therefore non-m::xlifiabl
in the majority of jurisdictions, is whether the agreement to make such
payments was made in return for a relinauishment of property rights of
similar value by the other party.
In the present case, Plaintiff relinquished her rights in property

worth $3,500.00 or $7,500.00 in return for property valued at $46,000.00
subject to a m::rrtgage indebtedness of $13,653.46.

The greatly disproportia

share of property received by Plaintiff is a strong indication the m:mthly
payments of $176.50 were in the nature of support, to enable Plaintiff
to remain in the home so long as she desired and did not renarry, and
were not part of an integrated property settlement.
POrnT II
THE cruRT RITAINS JURISDICTION 1'0 MODIFY PROPER'.IY SETI'I.EMEr\'ITS
WHERE THERE HAS BEEN A Wli'ERIAL CPA~ OF CIRCUMSrANCES.

Should this c.ourt find that the m:mthly payr!le!lts of $176.50 made
by Defendant .vere not in the nature of support payments but .vere part

of a distribution of the parties' property rights, it is still within
the power of a Utah c.ourt to m::xlify such provisions upon a proper showing
of change of circumstances.
Section 30-3-5 of the Utah Code Annotated provides that:

-10-
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The court shall have continuing jurisdiction to
make such subsequent changes or new orders with respect
to the support and TI'.3.intenance of the parties,
the custody of the children and their support
and oaintenance, or the distribution of the property
as shall be reasonable and necessary.
This section has been construed "to confer jurisdiction upon the
court to make such changes in those cases only where there has been
a change in the circumstance or condition of a party since the entry
of the original decree." Dixon v. Dixon, 240 P.2d 1211, 1214 (Utah 1952).
In

Dixon, the divorce decree awarded respondent the business property but

allowed appellant to pay off the indebtedness and receive the entire
business property should respondent default on the payments.

Despite

appellant's argument that the court had no authority to rrodify the
decree, since the original decree was final and fixed the property
rights, the court exercised its powers, considered the equities in the
case, and m:x:lified the decree concerning the property division upon
respondent's default in payments.
The Utah Court again dealt with this question in Iverson v. Iverson
526 P.2d 1126, 1127 (Utah 1974).

It cited Section 30-3-5 of the

Utah Code Annotated and stated that this includes "the power to take
property from one spouse and to award it to another where the interests
of justice so require".

The court also stated all aspects of divorce

proceedings are equitable and the continuing jurisdiction of the court
is equitable.
The facts for the Court's consideration are as follows:
Defendant was ordered to pay $300.00 per rronth alim:my and Plaintiff
was awarded all of the parties ' interest in the home and real property.
She sold the hor.E in July, 1977 for $60,000.00.

The outstanding rrortgage
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indebtedness at that tirre, and presently, is approximately $13,000.00.
Should Plaintiff be required to pay the rrortgage indebtedness, she will
still have received property frorn the marriage with a value of $47 ,000.00.
Defendant received prc:perty frorn the marriage with a value of $3,500.00
or $7,500.00.
Since Plaintiff has married Dr. Chandler and sold the hare for a
substantial arrount,she is no longer in need of rronthly payments from
Defendant to pay the rrortgage payments.

To require Defendant to pay

the outstanding rrortgage indebtedness, vtrl.ch is

~

or three tirres m:rre

than the entire property he received, and vtrl.ch 'WOUld give Plaintiff
property fran the marriage

~rth

$60,000.00 and place Defendant in the

position of having a deficit of $9,500.00 or $5,500.00 (depending on
the correct value of the Florida property) after ccntributing to the
acquisition of the marital property for 30 years 'WOUld be tmequitable.
'lherefore, this Court should exercise its equitable jurisdiction and
find that Plaintiff's remarriage and sale of the hare, and receipt of
substantially all of the marital property, relieves the Defendant of any
obligation of paying the tmpaid m:>rtgage installlrents.

POOO' III
A DECREE, FOUNDED UPON A STIPlIT.ATION CX:NI'AINING A MATERIAL MISTAKE
AND MISUNDERSTANDTI{;, FAILS IN 1HE SAME }WINER AS A CO~ITRACT.
The issues of support and property division were never litigated.

Rather, the Court based its decree upon the Stipulation the parties had
entered into.

The Stipulation contained a material mistake in that the

parties failed to designate exactly what they were agreeing to when they
agreed that Defendant 'WOUld pay to Plaintiff $176.50 per rocmth to be
applied to the rrortgage payrnents.

The Stipulation was silent as to whether

the m:mthly payrnents were in the nature of support or were in consideratiCJl
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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fo,_ l:'hintHf's relinquishment of her property rights; how remarriage,

the death of Defendant, the death of Plaintiff or sale of the home 'WOU.ld
affect them; and whether or not they were rrodifiable by either party
upon a change of circumstances.

There was not true "rreeting of the minds"

cmcerning the above-nentimed cmtingencies and therefore no binding
agreement.
Plaintiff contends the parties intended the payrrents to continue
until the full rrortgage indebtedness was paid, regardless of her
remarriage or sale of the property.
stated.

HovJever, this was never specifically

Defendant, however, intended them to be in the nature of support

and that they 'WOUld terminate upon Plaintiff's remarriage or sale of
the property.

This too was not specifically stated.

According to Corbin on Contracts, a corrrron fonn of mistake in the
making of contracts is a mistake as to the meaning of the
expressions used.

~rds

&>th parties may know with accuracy the

but understand them differently.

~ds

and
used,

If there is rrore than one reasonable

meaning under the existing circumstances and neither party had reason
to know of the other's meaning, the contract r:iay be recindable.

As

was stated by Corbin:
"But if the parties had materially different
meanings, and neither on knew or had
reason to know the meaning of the other,
there is no contract."
Corbin on Contracts, Vol I, §104
As was stated by the court in Buol Machine

Co. v. Buckens, 153 A.2d

826, 827; (Conn. 1959):
''Recission of a contract on the ground of 11Utual mistake
may be granted in a proper case where the mistake is
corrm:m to both parties and by reason of it each
had done what neither intended."

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-13-

If either party was negligent in this case the two parties were

equally negligent in failing to state precisely what they intended in
their stipulation.

'!here is no reason for penalizing one for the benefit

of the other where there has been a mutual mistake and the pa.i:ties are
equally responsible for the mistake.

Therefore, this Court should recind

that provision of the Stipulation concerning the I!DI1thly payrrents to be
applied to the rrortgage payrrents and mld the sane provision in the decree
as being unenforcable and remand the case so that the matter can be
litigated.
CCNCWSICN

That portion of the Decree of Divorce dealing with I!DI1thly payrrentl
of $176.50, to be applied to the rrortgage payrrents, and the parties'
Stipulation upon which the Decree was based, were ambigu:>us and contained
critical emissions.

Defendant was not specifically ordered to asS\.ma

and pay the entire unpaid rrortgage installllents despite Plaintiff's

renarriage and/or sale of the l'x::lte.
'Ille

Decree and 1\greerrent did not state such payrrents were in

consideration for Plaintiff's relinquisl'ment of her property rights. In fact,
Plaintiff only relinquished her rights in property having a minimal
to the property rights Defen:lant relinquished.

value~

Plaintiff's receipt of such

a disproportionate share of the property strongly indicates the rronthly payire
of $176.50 were not part of an integrated property settlem:mt but were in
the nature of support and severable from the property settlerrent provisions.
Th:! material omissions and ambiguity in the stipulation derronstrate

that there was no ''meeting of the nrinds" as to critical matters.

A

decree founded upon a recindable contract should not be held enforceable.

-14-
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Wh.erher this Cburt finds the payrrents were in the nature of
supfX)rt and severable frcm the property settlerrent, or whether it finds
such paynents were part of an integrated property settlement, it should
exercise its equitable power in reviewing the case, and rrodify the
disputed provision of the Decree.

Considering the material change of

circumstances, it w:iuld re unequitable to require Defendant to continue
making the payrrents.

Plaintiff has no need of continuing rronthly payments

to enable her to live in the OO!re since her rerrarriage and the profit

frcm the sale of the

heme

is rrore than adequate to pay off the existing

rrortgage indebtedness, and in addition leave Plaintiff with approximately
$47,000.00.
DATED this

!}O +iv

day of February, 1979.

RESP:OCTFULLY SUIMITI'ED,
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lWID DELIVERY CERITFICA1E

I do hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Brief was hand
delivered to Hal M. Swenson, Fabian & Clendenin, Eighth Floor,
Cont~al

'd4J

Bank Building, Salt l.Bke City, Utah

84101, on this

day of February, 1979.
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